The expression of norms as a speech act: assessing the explanatory power of theories of interpretation

The expression of norms is a kind of speech act that bears very specific invariant features. It is submitted that a rigorous assessment of such features makes explicit some relevant limitations to the communicative process between the speaker (the lawmaking authority) and the hearers (the norm addressees). Our claim is two-fold. On the one hand, regarding the propositional contents expressed, we claim that the specific features of the expression of norms limit «what» can be appropriately uttered while expressing norms. On the other hand, these limitations impact the understanding of what was uttered. On the basis that theories of interpretation function as meta-explanations (i.e., explanations of interpretations), we sustain that the higher the coherence between a theory and the invariants of the phenomena it purports to explain, the better it will be. Upon review of the most relevant theories of interpretation, we claim that some theories evidence low explanatory power as their premises are incoherent with the explanandum. We conclude by submitting that, for the opposite reasons, textualism is the theory of interpretation that evidences the higher explanatory power.