{"id":3445,"date":"2022-07-19T14:58:00","date_gmt":"2022-07-19T14:58:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/lisbonpubliclaw.pt\/?post_type=publicacoes&#038;p=3445"},"modified":"2023-09-22T13:42:20","modified_gmt":"2023-09-22T13:42:20","slug":"conceptual-norms-contrasting-theories","status":"publish","type":"publicacoes","link":"https:\/\/lisbonpubliclaw.pt\/en\/publicacoes\/conceptual-norms-contrasting-theories\/","title":{"rendered":"Conceptual norms: contrasting theories"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p>Mainstream accounts of conceptual norms depict them as a specifc kind of (sub) norms in as much as they establish a certain equivalence without making reference to an action-type, which implies also that they lack a deontic modalization. However, such non-prescriptive explanation raises some serious problems, mainly when it is assumed that the introduction of a conceptual norm into a normative system changes the content of the system. Those problems pave the way to contrast such explanation with a prescriptive alternative according to which conceptual norms are regulative in character, though with the peculiarity of addressing the mental action of qualifying something in accordance with a given equivalence. All-things-considered, from such contrast it seems to follow that the prescriptive explanation is less problematic than the non-prescriptive one<\/p>\n","protected":false},"template":"","meta":{"imagem-da-publicacao":"https:\/\/lisbonpubliclaw.pt\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/07\/conceptual-norms.jpg","areas-de-investigacao":"Teoria do Direito","investigador-responsavel":[],"editor-externo":"","editor":[],"autores-externos":"David Duarte","referencia-biografica":"DUARTE, D. 2023. Conceptual Norms: Contrasting Theories. Isonomia. 58. 32-56.","projeto-a-que-pertence":"Lisbon Legal Theory","selecionar_o_projeto_a_que_pertence":[],"titulo-do-livro-revista":"Isonomia ","ano":"2022","isbn":"","editora":"","link-para-download":"https:\/\/www.isonomia.itam.mx\/index.php\/revista-cientifica\/article\/download\/481\/2591"},"cluster":[34],"categoria-da-publicacao":[38],"grupo-de-investigacao":[13],"class_list":["post-3445","publicacoes","type-publicacoes","status-publish","hentry","cluster-lisbon-legal-theory","categoria-da-publicacao-artigo","grupo-de-investigacao-teoria-e-filosofia-do-direito"],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v27.2 - https:\/\/yoast.com\/product\/yoast-seo-wordpress\/ -->\n<title>Conceptual norms: contrasting theories - Lisbon Public Law<\/title>\n<meta name=\"description\" content=\"Mainstream accounts of conceptual norms depict them as a specifc kind of (sub) norms in as much as they establish a certain equivalence without making reference to an action-type, which implies also that they lack a deontic modalization. However, such non-prescriptive explanation raises some serious problems, mainly when it is assumed that the introduction of a conceptual norm into a normative system changes the content of the system. Those problems pave the way to contrast such explanation with a prescriptive alternative according to which conceptual norms are regulative in character, though with the peculiarity of addressing the mental action of qualifying something in accordance with a given equivalence. All-things-considered, from such contrast it seems to follow that the prescriptive explanation is less problematic than the non-prescriptive one\" \/>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/lisbonpubliclaw.pt\/en\/publicacoes\/conceptual-norms-contrasting-theories\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Conceptual norms: contrasting theories - Lisbon Public Law\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"Mainstream accounts of conceptual norms depict them as a specifc kind of (sub) norms in as much as they establish a certain equivalence without making reference to an action-type, which implies also that they lack a deontic modalization. However, such non-prescriptive explanation raises some serious problems, mainly when it is assumed that the introduction of a conceptual norm into a normative system changes the content of the system. Those problems pave the way to contrast such explanation with a prescriptive alternative according to which conceptual norms are regulative in character, though with the peculiarity of addressing the mental action of qualifying something in accordance with a given equivalence. 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However, such non-prescriptive explanation raises some serious problems, mainly when it is assumed that the introduction of a conceptual norm into a normative system changes the content of the system. Those problems pave the way to contrast such explanation with a prescriptive alternative according to which conceptual norms are regulative in character, though with the peculiarity of addressing the mental action of qualifying something in accordance with a given equivalence. 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