{"id":3384,"date":"2021-01-04T22:06:00","date_gmt":"2021-01-04T22:06:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/lisbonpubliclaw.pt\/?post_type=publicacoes&#038;p=3384"},"modified":"2023-10-02T16:01:08","modified_gmt":"2023-10-02T16:01:08","slug":"brute-balancing-proportionality-and-meta-weighing-of-reasons","status":"publish","type":"publicacoes","link":"https:\/\/lisbonpubliclaw.pt\/en\/publicacoes\/brute-balancing-proportionality-and-meta-weighing-of-reasons\/","title":{"rendered":"Brute balancing, proportionality and meta-weighing of reasons"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p>O presente artigo tem por objetivo analisar e aprofundar o conceito de pondera\u00e7\u00e3o e explorar em que medida o discurso das raz\u00f5es pode ser \u00fatil em contextos de pondera\u00e7\u00e3o. Em primeiro lugar, distinguirei concetualmente entre pondera\u00e7\u00e3o bruta e pondera\u00e7\u00e3o orientada, proporcionalidade e pondera\u00e7\u00e3o. Em seguida, defenderei que a solu\u00e7\u00e3o de conflitos constitucionais irresol\u00faveis por normas de conflitos exige uma pondera\u00e7\u00e3o num conjunto de circunst\u00e2ncias relevantes; mas o passo mais importante no racioc\u00ednio jur\u00eddico em causa diz respeito a um processo de pondera\u00e7\u00e3o de segunda ordem que permite justificar os valores a atribuir a intensidades de interfer\u00eancias, bem como a graus de certeza. Afirmarei tamb\u00e9m que o objeto de pondera\u00e7\u00e3o s\u00e3o as raz\u00f5es e n\u00e3o as normas propriamente ditas, bem como que as raz\u00f5es e n\u00e3o os princ\u00edpios s\u00e3o os portadores de peso. Para o efeito, desenvolverei um modelo de raz\u00f5es inspirado no aparelho de racioc\u00ednio pr\u00e1tico particularista, a utilizar como principal instrumento dos decisores para a resolu\u00e7\u00e3o de conflitos normativos prima facie irresol\u00faveis \u00e0 luz das propriedades dos casos particulares, que considero constitu\u00edrem um caso de particularismo local. De acordo com este modelo, as raz\u00f5es podem variar consoante os contextos, em resultado de condi\u00e7\u00f5es (facilitadoras e desincentivadoras) que criam e eliminam raz\u00f5es para agir, e de modificadores (intensificadores e atenuadores) que alteram o peso das raz\u00f5es normativas para agir. Por \u00faltimo, argumentarei que este modelo, embora possa funcionar de forma aut\u00f3noma, pode tamb\u00e9m ser encarado como o complemento ideal da &#8220;F\u00f3rmula do Peso&#8221; de Alexy no que respeita \u00e0 sua justifica\u00e7\u00e3o externa.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"template":"","meta":{"imagem-da-publicacao":"https:\/\/lisbonpubliclaw.pt\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/01\/Chapter_Brute-Balancing-Proportionality.png","areas-de-investigacao":"Teoria do Direito","investigador-responsavel":[],"editor-externo":"Jan-R. Sieckmann","editor":["1744"],"autores-externos":"","referencia-biografica":"Silva Sampaio J. (2021) Brute Balancing, Proportionality and Meta-Weighing of Reasons. In: Sieckmann JR. (eds) Proportionality, Balancing, and Rights: Robert Alexy's Theory of Constitutional Rights. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 136. Springer, Cham","projeto-a-que-pertence":"Lisbon Legal Theory","selecionar_o_projeto_a_que_pertence":[],"titulo-do-livro-revista":"Proportionality, Balancing, and Rights: Robert Alexy's Theory of Constitutional Rights","ano":"2021","isbn":"978-3-030-77321-2","editora":"Springer","link-para-download":"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/book\/10.1007\/978-3-030-77321-2"},"cluster":[34],"categoria-da-publicacao":[24],"grupo-de-investigacao":[13],"class_list":["post-3384","publicacoes","type-publicacoes","status-publish","hentry","cluster-lisbon-legal-theory","categoria-da-publicacao-capitulo-de-livro","grupo-de-investigacao-teoria-e-filosofia-do-direito"],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v27.2 - https:\/\/yoast.com\/product\/yoast-seo-wordpress\/ -->\n<title>Brute balancing, proportionality and meta-weighing of reasons - Lisbon Public Law<\/title>\n<meta name=\"description\" content=\"The present paper aims at analysing and fleshing out the concept of balancing and explores to what extent the discourse of reasons can be helpful in weighing contexts. First of all, I will conceptually distinguish between brute balancing and guided balancing, proportionality and weighing. Then I will argue that the solution of constitutional conflicts irresolvable by norms of conflicts require balancing under a set of relevant circumstances; but the most important step in the legal reasoning at stake concerns a second-order weighing process which makes it possible to justify the values to be attributed to intensities of interferences, as well as to degrees of certainty. I will also claim that the object of weighing are reasons and not norms themselves, as well as that reasons and not principles are the weight bearers. For this endeavour, I will develop a model of reasons inspired by the particularist practical reasoning apparatus to be used as the main tool for decision-makers to solve prima facie irresolvable normative conflicts in light of particular cases\u2019 properties, which I believe do constitute a case of local particularism. According to this model, reasons can vary across contexts as a result of conditions (enablers and disablers) that create and eliminate reasons to act, and modifiers (intensifiers and attenuators) that change the weight of the normative reasons to act. Lastly, I will argue that this model, although it can operate independently, can also be envisaged as the ideal complement to Alexy\u2019s \u201cWeight Formula\u201d regarding its external justification.\" \/>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/lisbonpubliclaw.pt\/en\/publicacoes\/brute-balancing-proportionality-and-meta-weighing-of-reasons\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Brute balancing, proportionality and meta-weighing of reasons - Lisbon Public Law\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"The present paper aims at analysing and fleshing out the concept of balancing and explores to what extent the discourse of reasons can be helpful in weighing contexts. First of all, I will conceptually distinguish between brute balancing and guided balancing, proportionality and weighing. Then I will argue that the solution of constitutional conflicts irresolvable by norms of conflicts require balancing under a set of relevant circumstances; but the most important step in the legal reasoning at stake concerns a second-order weighing process which makes it possible to justify the values to be attributed to intensities of interferences, as well as to degrees of certainty. I will also claim that the object of weighing are reasons and not norms themselves, as well as that reasons and not principles are the weight bearers. For this endeavour, I will develop a model of reasons inspired by the particularist practical reasoning apparatus to be used as the main tool for decision-makers to solve prima facie irresolvable normative conflicts in light of particular cases\u2019 properties, which I believe do constitute a case of local particularism. According to this model, reasons can vary across contexts as a result of conditions (enablers and disablers) that create and eliminate reasons to act, and modifiers (intensifiers and attenuators) that change the weight of the normative reasons to act. Lastly, I will argue that this model, although it can operate independently, can also be envisaged as the ideal complement to Alexy\u2019s \u201cWeight Formula\u201d regarding its external justification.\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/lisbonpubliclaw.pt\/en\/publicacoes\/brute-balancing-proportionality-and-meta-weighing-of-reasons\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Lisbon Public Law\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2023-10-02T16:01:08+00:00\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"2 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\/\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/lisbonpubliclaw.pt\/publicacoes\/brute-balancing-proportionality-and-meta-weighing-of-reasons\/\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/lisbonpubliclaw.pt\/publicacoes\/brute-balancing-proportionality-and-meta-weighing-of-reasons\/\",\"name\":\"Brute balancing, proportionality and meta-weighing of reasons - Lisbon Public Law\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/lisbonpubliclaw.pt\/#website\"},\"datePublished\":\"2021-01-04T22:06:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2023-10-02T16:01:08+00:00\",\"description\":\"The present paper aims at analysing and fleshing out the concept of balancing and explores to what extent the discourse of reasons can be helpful in weighing contexts. First of all, I will conceptually distinguish between brute balancing and guided balancing, proportionality and weighing. Then I will argue that the solution of constitutional conflicts irresolvable by norms of conflicts require balancing under a set of relevant circumstances; but the most important step in the legal reasoning at stake concerns a second-order weighing process which makes it possible to justify the values to be attributed to intensities of interferences, as well as to degrees of certainty. I will also claim that the object of weighing are reasons and not norms themselves, as well as that reasons and not principles are the weight bearers. For this endeavour, I will develop a model of reasons inspired by the particularist practical reasoning apparatus to be used as the main tool for decision-makers to solve prima facie irresolvable normative conflicts in light of particular cases\u2019 properties, which I believe do constitute a case of local particularism. According to this model, reasons can vary across contexts as a result of conditions (enablers and disablers) that create and eliminate reasons to act, and modifiers (intensifiers and attenuators) that change the weight of the normative reasons to act. Lastly, I will argue that this model, although it can operate independently, can also be envisaged as the ideal complement to Alexy\u2019s \u201cWeight Formula\u201d regarding its external justification.\",\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/lisbonpubliclaw.pt\/publicacoes\/brute-balancing-proportionality-and-meta-weighing-of-reasons\/#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\/\/lisbonpubliclaw.pt\/publicacoes\/brute-balancing-proportionality-and-meta-weighing-of-reasons\/\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/lisbonpubliclaw.pt\/publicacoes\/brute-balancing-proportionality-and-meta-weighing-of-reasons\/#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Home\",\"item\":\"https:\/\/lisbonpubliclaw.pt\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"Publica\u00e7\u00f5es\",\"item\":\"https:\/\/lisbonpubliclaw.pt\/publicacoes\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":3,\"name\":\"Brute balancing, proportionality and meta-weighing of reasons\"}]},{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/lisbonpubliclaw.pt\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/lisbonpubliclaw.pt\/\",\"name\":\"Lisbon Public Law\",\"description\":\"Public Law Research Centre in Lisbon\",\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/lisbonpubliclaw.pt\/#organization\"},\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\/\/lisbonpubliclaw.pt\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":{\"@type\":\"PropertyValueSpecification\",\"valueRequired\":true,\"valueName\":\"search_term_string\"}}],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\"},{\"@type\":\"Organization\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/lisbonpubliclaw.pt\/#organization\",\"name\":\"Lisbon Public Law\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/lisbonpubliclaw.pt\/\",\"logo\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/lisbonpubliclaw.pt\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/lisbonpubliclaw.pt\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/06\/WhatsApp-Image-2023-06-19-at-11.01.50-1.jpeg\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\/\/lisbonpubliclaw.pt\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/06\/WhatsApp-Image-2023-06-19-at-11.01.50-1.jpeg\",\"width\":354,\"height\":354,\"caption\":\"Lisbon Public Law\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/lisbonpubliclaw.pt\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/\"}}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"Brute balancing, proportionality and meta-weighing of reasons - Lisbon Public Law","description":"The present paper aims at analysing and fleshing out the concept of balancing and explores to what extent the discourse of reasons can be helpful in weighing contexts. 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According to this model, reasons can vary across contexts as a result of conditions (enablers and disablers) that create and eliminate reasons to act, and modifiers (intensifiers and attenuators) that change the weight of the normative reasons to act. Lastly, I will argue that this model, although it can operate independently, can also be envisaged as the ideal complement to Alexy\u2019s \u201cWeight Formula\u201d regarding its external justification.","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/lisbonpubliclaw.pt\/en\/publicacoes\/brute-balancing-proportionality-and-meta-weighing-of-reasons\/","og_locale":"en_US","og_type":"article","og_title":"Brute balancing, proportionality and meta-weighing of reasons - Lisbon Public Law","og_description":"The present paper aims at analysing and fleshing out the concept of balancing and explores to what extent the discourse of reasons can be helpful in weighing contexts. First of all, I will conceptually distinguish between brute balancing and guided balancing, proportionality and weighing. Then I will argue that the solution of constitutional conflicts irresolvable by norms of conflicts require balancing under a set of relevant circumstances; but the most important step in the legal reasoning at stake concerns a second-order weighing process which makes it possible to justify the values to be attributed to intensities of interferences, as well as to degrees of certainty. I will also claim that the object of weighing are reasons and not norms themselves, as well as that reasons and not principles are the weight bearers. For this endeavour, I will develop a model of reasons inspired by the particularist practical reasoning apparatus to be used as the main tool for decision-makers to solve prima facie irresolvable normative conflicts in light of particular cases\u2019 properties, which I believe do constitute a case of local particularism. According to this model, reasons can vary across contexts as a result of conditions (enablers and disablers) that create and eliminate reasons to act, and modifiers (intensifiers and attenuators) that change the weight of the normative reasons to act. Lastly, I will argue that this model, although it can operate independently, can also be envisaged as the ideal complement to Alexy\u2019s \u201cWeight Formula\u201d regarding its external justification.","og_url":"https:\/\/lisbonpubliclaw.pt\/en\/publicacoes\/brute-balancing-proportionality-and-meta-weighing-of-reasons\/","og_site_name":"Lisbon Public Law","article_modified_time":"2023-10-02T16:01:08+00:00","twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_misc":{"Est. reading time":"2 minutes"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/lisbonpubliclaw.pt\/publicacoes\/brute-balancing-proportionality-and-meta-weighing-of-reasons\/","url":"https:\/\/lisbonpubliclaw.pt\/publicacoes\/brute-balancing-proportionality-and-meta-weighing-of-reasons\/","name":"Brute balancing, proportionality and meta-weighing of reasons - Lisbon Public Law","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/lisbonpubliclaw.pt\/#website"},"datePublished":"2021-01-04T22:06:00+00:00","dateModified":"2023-10-02T16:01:08+00:00","description":"The present paper aims at analysing and fleshing out the concept of balancing and explores to what extent the discourse of reasons can be helpful in weighing contexts. First of all, I will conceptually distinguish between brute balancing and guided balancing, proportionality and weighing. Then I will argue that the solution of constitutional conflicts irresolvable by norms of conflicts require balancing under a set of relevant circumstances; but the most important step in the legal reasoning at stake concerns a second-order weighing process which makes it possible to justify the values to be attributed to intensities of interferences, as well as to degrees of certainty. I will also claim that the object of weighing are reasons and not norms themselves, as well as that reasons and not principles are the weight bearers. For this endeavour, I will develop a model of reasons inspired by the particularist practical reasoning apparatus to be used as the main tool for decision-makers to solve prima facie irresolvable normative conflicts in light of particular cases\u2019 properties, which I believe do constitute a case of local particularism. According to this model, reasons can vary across contexts as a result of conditions (enablers and disablers) that create and eliminate reasons to act, and modifiers (intensifiers and attenuators) that change the weight of the normative reasons to act. 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