{"id":3370,"date":"2019-01-02T21:43:00","date_gmt":"2019-01-02T21:43:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/lisbonpubliclaw.pt\/?post_type=publicacoes&p=3370"},"modified":"2023-10-03T13:25:04","modified_gmt":"2023-10-03T13:25:04","slug":"an-almost-pure-theory-of-legal-interpretation-within-legal-science","status":"publish","type":"publicacoes","link":"https:\/\/lisbonpubliclaw.pt\/en\/publicacoes\/an-almost-pure-theory-of-legal-interpretation-within-legal-science\/","title":{"rendered":"An almost pure theory of legal interpretation within legal science"},"content":{"rendered":"

The purpose of this article is primarily to shed some light on the question of what we mean by interpretation, to assess whether or not legal interpretation is a scientific operation and whether or not it is possible to obtain legal knowledge in a scientific manner. For this endeavour, firstly, I will lay out a conceptual framework of law and legal science\u2014a soft normativist model. Secondly, I will outline the basis of my theory of legal interpretation, in which I will argue, among other things, for a broad conception of legal interpretation (even if one may distinguish between noetic and dianoetic interpretations), that its object is composed of legal formulations (linguistic conception); that law is only partly or locally indeterminate, which guarantees a high level of scientificity in the cases of determination; and that interpretation is a norm-guided operation involving language rules and legal interpretative norms. Thirdly, I conclude that legal knowledge can be scientific, especially in cases of legal determinacy\u2014clear cases\u2014that it is also possible to make truth propositions about law and that, accordingly, sometimes there is also legal objectivity.<\/p>","protected":false},"template":"","meta":{"imagem-da-publicacao":"https:\/\/lisbonpubliclaw.pt\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/01\/Chapter_An-Almost-Pure-Theory.png","areas-de-investigacao":"Teoria do Direito","investigador-responsavel":["1732","1744","1759"],"editor-externo":"","editor":["1744"],"autores-externos":"","referencia-biografica":"Sampaio, J.S. (2019). An Almost Pure Theory of Legal Interpretation within Legal Science. In: Duarte, D., Moniz Lopes, P., Silva Sampaio, J. (eds) Legal Interpretation and Scientific Knowledge. Springer, Cham.","projeto-a-que-pertence":"Lisbon Legal Theory","selecionar_o_projeto_a_que_pertence":[],"titulo-do-livro-revista":"Legal Interpretation and Scientific Knowledge","ano":"2019","isbn":"978-3-030-18671-5","editora":"Springer","link-para-download":"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/book\/10.1007\/978-3-030-18671-5"},"cluster":[34],"categoria-da-publicacao":[24],"grupo-de-investigacao":[13],"class_list":["post-3370","publicacoes","type-publicacoes","status-publish","hentry","cluster-lisbon-legal-theory","categoria-da-publicacao-capitulo-de-livro","grupo-de-investigacao-teoria-e-filosofia-do-direito"],"yoast_head":"\nAn almost pure theory of legal interpretation within legal science - Lisbon Public Law<\/title>\n<meta name=\"description\" content=\"The purpose of this article is primarily to shed some light on the question of what we mean by interpretation, to assess whether or not legal interpretation is a scientific operation and whether or not it is possible to obtain legal knowledge in a scientific manner. For this endeavour, firstly, I will lay out a conceptual framework of law and legal science\u2014a soft normativist model. Secondly, I will outline the basis of my theory of legal interpretation, in which I will argue, among other things, for a broad conception of legal interpretation (even if one may distinguish between noetic and dianoetic interpretations), that its object is composed of legal formulations (linguistic conception); that law is only partly or locally indeterminate, which guarantees a high level of scientificity in the cases of determination; and that interpretation is a norm-guided operation involving language rules and legal interpretative norms. Thirdly, I conclude that legal knowledge can be scientific, especially in cases of legal determinacy\u2014clear cases\u2014that it is also possible to make truth propositions about law and that, accordingly, sometimes there is also legal objectivity.\" \/>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/lisbonpubliclaw.pt\/en\/publicacoes\/an-almost-pure-theory-of-legal-interpretation-within-legal-science\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"An almost pure theory of legal interpretation within legal science - Lisbon Public Law\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"The purpose of this article is primarily to shed some light on the question of what we mean by interpretation, to assess whether or not legal interpretation is a scientific operation and whether or not it is possible to obtain legal knowledge in a scientific manner. For this endeavour, firstly, I will lay out a conceptual framework of law and legal science\u2014a soft normativist model. Secondly, I will outline the basis of my theory of legal interpretation, in which I will argue, among other things, for a broad conception of legal interpretation (even if one may distinguish between noetic and dianoetic interpretations), that its object is composed of legal formulations (linguistic conception); that law is only partly or locally indeterminate, which guarantees a high level of scientificity in the cases of determination; and that interpretation is a norm-guided operation involving language rules and legal interpretative norms. Thirdly, I conclude that legal knowledge can be scientific, especially in cases of legal determinacy\u2014clear cases\u2014that it is also possible to make truth propositions about law and that, accordingly, sometimes there is also legal objectivity.\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/lisbonpubliclaw.pt\/en\/publicacoes\/an-almost-pure-theory-of-legal-interpretation-within-legal-science\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Lisbon Public Law\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2023-10-03T13:25:04+00:00\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"2 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\\\/\\\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/lisbonpubliclaw.pt\\\/publicacoes\\\/an-almost-pure-theory-of-legal-interpretation-within-legal-science\\\/\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/lisbonpubliclaw.pt\\\/publicacoes\\\/an-almost-pure-theory-of-legal-interpretation-within-legal-science\\\/\",\"name\":\"An almost pure theory of legal interpretation within legal science - Lisbon Public Law\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/lisbonpubliclaw.pt\\\/#website\"},\"datePublished\":\"2019-01-02T21:43:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2023-10-03T13:25:04+00:00\",\"description\":\"The purpose of this article is primarily to shed some light on the question of what we mean by interpretation, to assess whether or not legal interpretation is a scientific operation and whether or not it is possible to obtain legal knowledge in a scientific manner. For this endeavour, firstly, I will lay out a conceptual framework of law and legal science\u2014a soft normativist model. Secondly, I will outline the basis of my theory of legal interpretation, in which I will argue, among other things, for a broad conception of legal interpretation (even if one may distinguish between noetic and dianoetic interpretations), that its object is composed of legal formulations (linguistic conception); that law is only partly or locally indeterminate, which guarantees a high level of scientificity in the cases of determination; and that interpretation is a norm-guided operation involving language rules and legal interpretative norms. 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