{"id":3370,"date":"2019-01-02T21:43:00","date_gmt":"2019-01-02T21:43:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/lisbonpubliclaw.pt\/?post_type=publicacoes&p=3370"},"modified":"2023-10-03T13:25:04","modified_gmt":"2023-10-03T13:25:04","slug":"an-almost-pure-theory-of-legal-interpretation-within-legal-science","status":"publish","type":"publicacoes","link":"https:\/\/lisbonpubliclaw.pt\/en\/publicacoes\/an-almost-pure-theory-of-legal-interpretation-within-legal-science\/","title":{"rendered":"An almost pure theory of legal interpretation within legal science"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

O objetivo deste artigo \u00e9 principalmente lan\u00e7ar alguma luz sobre a quest\u00e3o do que entendemos por interpreta\u00e7\u00e3o, avaliar se a interpreta\u00e7\u00e3o jur\u00eddica \u00e9 ou n\u00e3o uma opera\u00e7\u00e3o cient\u00edfica e se \u00e9 ou n\u00e3o poss\u00edvel obter conhecimento jur\u00eddico de forma cient\u00edfica. Para este esfor\u00e7o, em primeiro lugar, apresentarei um quadro conceptual do direito e da ci\u00eancia jur\u00eddica \u2013 um modelo normativista suave. Em segundo lugar, delinearei a base da minha teoria da interpreta\u00e7\u00e3o jur\u00eddica, na qual defenderei, entre outras coisas, uma concep\u00e7\u00e3o ampla de interpreta\u00e7\u00e3o jur\u00eddica (mesmo que se possa distinguir entre interpreta\u00e7\u00f5es no\u00e9ticas e diano\u00e9ticas), que o seu objecto seja composto por formula\u00e7\u00f5es jur\u00eddicas (concep\u00e7\u00e3o lingu\u00edstica); que a lei \u00e9 apenas parcial ou localmente indeterminada, o que garante um elevado n\u00edvel de cientificidade nos casos de determina\u00e7\u00e3o; e que a interpreta\u00e7\u00e3o \u00e9 uma opera\u00e7\u00e3o guiada por normas que envolve regras lingu\u00edsticas e normas interpretativas jur\u00eddicas. Em terceiro lugar, concluo que o conhecimento jur\u00eddico pode ser cient\u00edfico, especialmente em casos de determina\u00e7\u00e3o jur\u00eddica \u2013 casos claros \u2013 que tamb\u00e9m \u00e9 poss\u00edvel fazer proposi\u00e7\u00f5es de verdade sobre o direito e que, consequentemente, por vezes h\u00e1 tamb\u00e9m objectividade jur\u00eddica.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"template":"","meta":{"imagem-da-publicacao":"https:\/\/lisbonpubliclaw.pt\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/01\/Chapter_An-Almost-Pure-Theory.png","areas-de-investigacao":"Teoria do Direito","investigador-responsavel":["1732","1744","1759"],"editor-externo":"","editor":["1744"],"autores-externos":"","referencia-biografica":"Sampaio, J.S. (2019). An Almost Pure Theory of Legal Interpretation within Legal Science. In: Duarte, D., Moniz Lopes, P., Silva Sampaio, J. (eds) Legal Interpretation and Scientific Knowledge. Springer, Cham.","projeto-a-que-pertence":"Lisbon Legal Theory","selecionar_o_projeto_a_que_pertence":[],"titulo-do-livro-revista":"Legal Interpretation and Scientific Knowledge","ano":"2019","isbn":"978-3-030-18671-5","editora":"Springer","link-para-download":"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/book\/10.1007\/978-3-030-18671-5"},"cluster":[34],"categoria-da-publicacao":[24],"grupo-de-investigacao":[13],"class_list":["post-3370","publicacoes","type-publicacoes","status-publish","hentry","cluster-lisbon-legal-theory","categoria-da-publicacao-capitulo-de-livro","grupo-de-investigacao-teoria-e-filosofia-do-direito"],"yoast_head":"\nAn almost pure theory of legal interpretation within legal science - Lisbon Public Law<\/title>\n<meta name=\"description\" content=\"The purpose of this article is primarily to shed some light on the question of what we mean by interpretation, to assess whether or not legal interpretation is a scientific operation and whether or not it is possible to obtain legal knowledge in a scientific manner. For this endeavour, firstly, I will lay out a conceptual framework of law and legal science\u2014a soft normativist model. Secondly, I will outline the basis of my theory of legal interpretation, in which I will argue, among other things, for a broad conception of legal interpretation (even if one may distinguish between noetic and dianoetic interpretations), that its object is composed of legal formulations (linguistic conception); that law is only partly or locally indeterminate, which guarantees a high level of scientificity in the cases of determination; and that interpretation is a norm-guided operation involving language rules and legal interpretative norms. Thirdly, I conclude that legal knowledge can be scientific, especially in cases of legal determinacy\u2014clear cases\u2014that it is also possible to make truth propositions about law and that, accordingly, sometimes there is also legal objectivity.\" \/>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/lisbonpubliclaw.pt\/en\/publicacoes\/an-almost-pure-theory-of-legal-interpretation-within-legal-science\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"An almost pure theory of legal interpretation within legal science - Lisbon Public Law\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"The purpose of this article is primarily to shed some light on the question of what we mean by interpretation, to assess whether or not legal interpretation is a scientific operation and whether or not it is possible to obtain legal knowledge in a scientific manner. 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