Against the partial reducibility thesis it may still be brought forward that analogy and balancing presuppose totally opposite normative conditions. This renders the whole idea of reduction inconsistent. Or: if an analogy depends on a gap and balancing presupposes more than one applicable norm, then analogy and balancing are incompatible.
Publication | Book Chapter
Theory and Philosophy of Law
Analogy and balancing once again: a reply to Bartosz Brożek
Book title / Magazine:
Analogy and Exemplary Reasoning in Legal Discourse
Analogy and Exemplary Reasoning in Legal Discourse
External Author(s):
David Duarte
David Duarte
External Editor(s):
Hendrik Kaptein; Bastiaan van der Velden
Hendrik Kaptein; Bastiaan van der Velden
Within the scope of the Project:
Lisbon Legal Theory
Lisbon Legal Theory
Research Areas:
Theory of Law
Theory of Law
Bibliographic reference:
Duarte, D. (2018). Analogy and balancing once again: A reply to Bartosz Brożek. In H. Kaptein & B. van der Velden (Eds.), Analogy and Exemplary Reasoning in Legal Discourse (pp. 109–122). Amsterdam University Press.
Duarte, D. (2018). Analogy and balancing once again: A reply to Bartosz Brożek. In H. Kaptein & B. van der Velden (Eds.), Analogy and Exemplary Reasoning in Legal Discourse (pp. 109–122). Amsterdam University Press.
Research Group(s):
Theory and Philosophy of Law
Theory and Philosophy of Law
978-90-485-3714-3
Publishing company: Amsterdam University Press
Year: 2018
