No passado dia 8 de agosto o Tribunal Constitucional (doravante TC) publicou o Acórdão n.º 785/2025 (doravante Acórdão) no qual, a pedido do Presidente da República, apreciou em processo de fiscalização preventiva da constitucionalidade do Decreto n.º 6/XVIII da Assembleia da República (doravante AR) que visa alterar a Lei n.º 23/27 (doravante lei dos estrangeiros). O TC acabou por se pronunciar: (i) pela inconstitucionalidade da nova redação do art. 98.º/1 da lei dos estrangeiros por violação do art 36.º/1 e 6 em conjugação com os arts. 18.º/2, 67.º/1, 68.º/1 e 69.º/1 da Constituição (doravante CRP); (ii) pela inconstitucionalidade da nova redação do art. 98.º/3 por violação dos arts. 36.º/1 e 6, 67.º/1, 68.º/1 e 69.º/1 da CRP; (iii) pela inconstitucionalidade da nova redação do art. 101.º/3 da lei dos estrangeiros por violação do art. 165.º/1, al. b) da CRP; (iv) pela inconstitucionalidade da nova redação do art. 105.º/1 da lei dos estrangeiros quando conjugado com a nova redação do art, 98.º/3 da mesma lei por violação dos arts. 36.º/1 e 6, 67.º/1, 68.º/1 e 69.º/1 da CRP; (v) pela inconstitucionalidade da nova redação do art. 87.º-B/2 da lei dos estrangeiros por violação dos arts. 20.º/1, 18.º/2 e 268.º/4 da CRP; e (vi) pela não inconstitucionalidade das novas redações dos arts. 98.º/2, art. 87.º-B/3 e 101.º/1, als. a) e b) da lei dos estrangeiros.

O Acórdão, tendo em conta a sensibilidade política e constitucional do tema, foi inevitavelmente divisivo entre os juízes conselheiros do TC. Devemos, no entanto, deixar imediatamente claro o seguinte, não iremos neste momento analisar a posição maioritária dos do TC ou as diversas declarações de voto vencido. Neste breve texto iremo-nos focar no pequeno, mas poderoso e a nosso ver perigoso à parte presente na declaração conjunta de voto vencido dos juízes conselheiros Gonçalo Almeida Ribeiro e José António Teles Pereira. Na sua declaração de voto vencido os juízes conselheiros apresentaram, tal como se pode verificar em todas as restantes declarações de voto vencido, contudo os dois juízes conselheiros não se limitaram à pura argumentação e interpretação jurídica para demonstrar a sua discórdia com a decisão do TC. Numa tentativa clara de algum modo diminuir a validade argumentativa do TC os juízes conselheiros apontaram no primeiro parágrafo da sua declaração conjunta que a maioria do TC realizou “…uma escolha ideológica” em vez de realizar um raciocínio que satisfizesse o “…ónus exigente de fundamentação”. Ora, apesar de concordarmos sem qualquer dúvida com a posição de que o TC jamais deverá na sua atividade tentar substituir o legislador, “A legislação numa democracia constitucional não deve ser o produto de uma transação entre as preferências políticas da maioria parlamentar e da maioria dos membros da jurisdição constitucional, mas um exercício de liberdade programática limitado pelo respeito pelos direitos fundamentais e princípios estruturantes de uma república de pessoas livres e iguais”, competindo ao TC assegurar o respeito por tais limites, nos termos das suas competências como estabelecidas nos arts. 277.º ss. da CRP, não podemos concordar com a identificação de uma escolha ideológica como se de um elemento negativo se tratasse numa pronúncia do TC.

O TC e por consequência os seus juízes conselheiros têm uma função no nosso Ordenamento Jurídico inerentemente política e ideológica. Uma Constituição de um Estado de Direito terá sempre no seu núcleo uma escolha ideológica ao redor da qual todo o Ordenamento Jurídico será construído, as divergências ou semelhanças entre as inúmeras Constituições modernas são em grande parte ideológicas resultantes dos ambientes políticos que as originaram. A CRP é inclusive uma Constituição com um núcleo ideológico forte que oferece uma grande predominância à proteção de inúmeros direitos fundamentais com o seu devido detalhe, diferentemente, por exemplo, da Constituição francesa que não trata de direitos fundamentais no seu texto. As origens ideológicas da CRP são, inclusive, expressamente assumidas pela mesma no seu preâmbulo. Como poderá então um TC, perante uma CRP cuja ideologia basilar se baseia na garantia dos direitos fundamentais dos cidadãos nos princípios basilares da democracia e no primado do Estado de Direito democrático, ser ideologicamente neutro ao averiguar se uma lei viola direitos fundamentais constitucionalmente? A resposta é simples, não pode.

A política e a ideologia não se restringem nem se deverão restringir, jamais, puramente ao processo legislativo, especialmente em matérias que toquem diretamente na esfera de proteção dos direitos fundamentais em qualquer Ordenamento Jurídico. O que os juízes conselheiros deverão realizar dentro das competências do TC é averiguar se as normas a ser fiscalizadas respeitam os limites ideológicos consagrados na CRP e pronunciar-se de modo adequadamente justificado. A ideologia da CRP deverá sempre guiar as pronúncias e decisões do TC e é de acordo com a mesma que os juízes conselheiros deverão formar os seus argumentos. O facto de a CRP ter uma ideologia basilar não é um facto positivo ou negativo, é um facto necessário para que a mesma seja uma Constituição, quer seja a mesma mais politicamente de esquerda ou de direita a mesma é antes de mais uma ideologia do Estado de Direito democrático. As famosas tentativas de realizar uma limpeza ideológica da CRP, especialmente por partidos de direita, não têm como verdadeiro objetivo retirar da CRP qualquer ideologia, mas sim substituir a ideologia presente na CRP por uma com a qual tal corrente política se identifica mais.

O TC assumir a base ideológica da CRP como pilar basilar de todas as suas decisões não deve, no entanto, servir de justificação para tentar substituir o papel do legislador na sua legítima discricionariedade democrática, algo a que a maioria dos juízes do TC chegou perigosamente perto de fazer no Acórdão, ou pelo menos perto o suficiente para nos causar desconforto. Ao analisar o art. 87.º-B/2 do Decreto de acordo com o princípio da proibição do excesso o TC quase cai na armadilha do teste da adequação, incorrendo mais numa análise da legitimidade política da norma e não da adequação objetiva da mesma. Só não consideramos que o TC cai completamente na armadilha do teste de adequação, cedendo à tentação de substituir o legislador que este teste apresenta, por não assumir definitivamente que a norma chumba no teste de adequação como se pode verificar no §79 do Acórdão.

É possível e perfeitamente legítima um juiz conselheiro discordar da decisão maioritária do TC e apresentar os seus argumentos hermenêuticos. Os juízes conselheiros Gonçalo Almeida Ribeiro e José António Teles Pereira, não se limitam, porém, a apresentar a sua discórdia jurídico-hermenêutica, mas sim a sua discórdia com a suposta “escolha ideológica” realizada pela maioria dos juízes conselheiros. Ao recorrer a este argumento os juízes conselheiros não se limitam, contudo, a tentar diminuir a legitimidade dos argumentos que baseiam a decisão maioritária, não só no Acórdão, mas também na sociedade portuguesa, pondo em xeque a posição maioritária do TC aos olhos de muitos portugueses. Eis que, não denegrindo a legitimidade dos argumentos jurídicos apresentados pelos juízes conselheiros na sua declaração de voto vencido, ao tentarem exaltar de algum modo os seus argumentos, como se os mesmos apresentassem uma neutralidade ideológica que lhes oferece uma maior legitimidade jurídica, os juízes conselheiros acabam, inadvertidamente, por revelar a sua própria “escolha ideológica”.

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Como tem sido habitual nestes casos, o acórdão goza de um conjunto muito alargado de votos de vencido que ocupam no seu conjunto quase três vezes mais páginas do que o acórdão propriamente dito. Ao contrário dos votos de vencido que defendem ora um direito fundamental à eutanásia, ora a sua proibição, a decisão principal pretende ser uma repetição da sua própria jurisprudência e da do Tribunal Europeu dos Direitos Humanos (TEDH) e ao mesmo tempo distanciar-se da “questão fraturante” e empurrá-la para o plano político. Diz o douto acórdão, numa matriz claramente Rawlsiana: “A posição do Tribunal Constitucional é, pois, a de que a morte assistida, como questão de princípio, é um problema de ordem política, cabendo ao legislador, no gozo da sua legitimidade democrática, arbitrar a tensão perene entre valores constitucionais de sentido contrário neste domínio de vida caracterizado pelo dissenso persistente e razoável entre os cidadãos.” (Parag. 15)

Colocam-se desde logo dois problemas prévios. O primeiro é o de que não é tão óbvio como o tribunal agora faz crer que, na sua jurisprudência anterior, se tenha posicionado com essa neutralidade, por exemplo quando refere que proteger a vida humana em todas as situações de grande sofrimento contra a autonomia individual seria contrário à dignidade humana (cf. parag. 32 do acórdão 123/2021, voto de vencido de Rui Guerra da Fonseca do acórdão em causa e Pereira Coutinho 2023). O segundo problema está na equiparação dessa mesma neutralidade devida com a jurisprudência do TEDH. É que os tribunais internacionais e os catálogos de Direitos Humanos, devem reserva-se a standards mínimos para aferir casos de violação, deixando “uma margem de apreciação” aos Estados dentro da qual lhes cabe à luz das suas tradições constitucionais aferir se uma qualquer lei está a violar esses direitos ou não. Quer isso dizer que, quando o TEDH estabelece uma não violação de um direito fundamental num caso, não significa necessariamente que o Estado deva decidir no mesmo sentido. O Estado tem ainda de atender aos contornos dos direitos aos quais se autovinculou na sua própria jurisdição, sobretudo quando, como o próprio Tribunal Constitucional reconhece (parag 24 do acórdão 123/2021), o direito à vida assume uma posição ímpar na nossa Constituição. Parece-nos, por isso, desadequada a citação do caso Dániel Karsai v. Hungary, de 13 de junho de 2024 para se retirar dela uma conclusão de não violação do direito, em vez de a utilizar com fonte mediata de interpretação do standard mínimo devido como o faz o juiz conselheiro Carlos Luís Medeiros de Carvalho.

Mas o grande problema que queríamos hoje tratar é saber se será apenas o legislador quem tem o papel de “arbitrar a tensão perene entre valores constitucionais”. Não estará o juiz constitucional incumbido desse papel quando marca a fronteira de quais são e quais é que não os dissensos razoáveis”?

O uso e abuso do princípio da dignidade da Pessoa Humana

Dentro dos valores constitucionais o princípio da dignidade da Pessoa Humana é o princípio basilar e fundamental dos Direitos Fundamentais (Art 1º). Enquanto critério interpretativo, ele é utilizado para reforçar decisões de inconstitucionalidade por violação do núcleo de um direito. Enquanto limite ao legislador, o princípio delimita as situações que, ferindo ou não o núcleo essencial de um direito em particular, consubstanciam um tratamento desumano, podendo inclusivamente ter uma função “normogenética” (Benedita Mac Crorie, 2003), isto é, de dele se deduzirem normas não expressamente previstas na constituição. De modo geral, o Tribunal tem sido muito cauteloso em utilizar este princípio enquanto ratio decidendi das suas decisões, mas tornou-se praticamente impossível deixar de o fazer nestas “questões fraturantes”. Verificamos que nestas, para além de diferentes visões políticas, encontramos também visões jurídicas muito diferentes sobre o significado de um princípio que deveria ser o estruturante do ordenamento constitucional (não só do nosso, mas de todos os que foram herdeiros do paradigma que se sucedeu ao trauma do regime nazi e todas as atrocidades que este cometeu sob a capa de uma aparente legalidade).

Estas diferenças refletidas nos anteriores acórdãos, repetem-se uma vez mais nos votos de vencido, alguns expressamente fundamentando a sua divergência no princípio da dignidade humana: Joana Fernandes Costa, Afonso Patrão, Rui Guerra da Fonseca para dela extrair um direito a uma morte autodeterminada;  Maria Benedita Urbano para exigir do Estado uma garantia de uma escolha efetiva entre a MMA, através de assegurar um mínimo de cuidados paliativos e João Carlos Loureiro, Carlos Medeiros de Carvalho para extraírem dela uma proibição de eutanásia. Pelo contrário, uma minoria mais cautelosa remete o problema para o conflito de direitos e a extensão que o direito à autodeterminação deve assumir (António José de Ascensão Ramos, José Eduardo Figueiredo Dias, em favor da MMA e José António Teles Pereira, defendendo que deve prevalecer a vida humana).

O que talvez não seja ainda demais recordar é que não são só estas situações polémicas que colocam uma tensão entre a autonomia dos sujeitos e outros valores constitucionais. De facto, o Direito é por natureza isso mesmo, uma regulação de vontades simultaneamente “autónomas” e inseridas em comunidade. A partir do constitucionalismo moderno esta regulamentação passa a estar fundamentada na constituição que simultaneamente a legitima e limita. À semelhança do que ocorreu com o fenómeno onusiano, nas constituições pós II guerra mundial preferimos remeter esse fundamento material para um conceito apreciado por todos, mas, ao mesmo tempo, interpretado de formas muito diferentes e como conseguimos perceber antagónicas. É urgente, por isso, uma reflexão sobre os fundamentos últimos do direito, antes que o rifte que se está a abrir possa destruir o elemento agregador das nossas sociedades.

Vamos falar acerca do elefante na sala

As visões subjacentes às divergências referidas partem de duas conceções muito diferentes do que é o ser humano e a relação que este estabelece com os demais, embora partam de uma premissa semelhante: o ser humano concreto é um ser livre, autónomo o qual deve valorizado com tal pelo direito. Para uma vertente objetiva de dignidade, enraizado na tradição judaico-cristã, é o ser que é valorizado pelo direito, impondo-lhe um absoluto respeito, desde logo pela sua vida, pressuposto material das suas dimensões espirituais. O ser humano deve ser antes de mais valorizado pelo ser que é, independentemente de estar apto ou não a exercer a sua vontade. O homem nunca pode ser utilizado como um mero meio, mas sim como um fim, até pelo próprio.  Para uma vertente subjetiva, é a liberdade que deve ser valorizada e é em função desta que se deduzem as demais prestações que o direito deve assegurar para que esta possa ser prosseguida (teoria da prestação, com raízes em Confúcio) para mais veja-se Melo Alexandrino, 2010) O ser humano é visto assim como um ser que só será valorizado se for potenciado ao máximo a sua visão de liberdade.

Concordamos que o tribunal não deva, qual “rei-filósofo” de que falava Platão, escolher uma destas visões, sem qualquer margem de abertura e tolerância para as demais. Porém, nem sempre é possível uma convivência pacífica entre as várias visões, pois nos casos fraturantes, ambas se veem ameaçadas no que há de mais precioso em cada uma delas (o respeito pelo ser ou a prestação do possa contribuir para a realização do outro). Quando a visão subjetiva de liberdade se torna incompatível com a conceção de homem herdada da conceção judaico-cristã, o juiz constitucional é obrigado a tomar uma decisão quanto à interpretação (extensiva ou restritiva) que faz das normas constitucionais ancoradas neste princípio. A escolha do tribunal constitucional foi, como dissemos, o de remeter essa decisão para o legislador: perante as divergências presentes na sociedade, a constituição não adotaria nenhuma das conceções razoáveis, apresentando antes um conceito fraco de dignidade, (defendendo, pelo contrário, um conceito forte: Carneiro da Frada, 2010)ou se quisermos um conceito flexível de homem. No entanto, o problema não se pode dar por resolvido.

Sabendo que a sociedade é cada vez mais plural, fica a questão de saber até onde irá a flexibilidade do juiz constitucional, que pretende conciliar todas as visões “razoáveis” subjacentes ao conceito de dignidade: afinal nele cabe um direito a uma morte autodeterminada (conceção confuciana), mas ao mesmo tempo obriga a um processo especialmente exigente por conta do respeito pela vida humana (conceção judaico-cristã), sem que consiga explicar satisfatoriamente como podem as duas ser logicamente articuladas no caso concreto. Poderiam estas duas visões ser compatibilizadas numa situação de exploração laboral consentida? Afastar o princípio da dignidade da pessoa humana do debate não resolve o problema de saber até onde pode ir a tolerância face a novas conceções de dignidade sem abdicar da coerência (não é possível ser tolerável com os intoleráveis). Sublinhamos este ponto, porque falar de dignidade enquanto limite é falar dos “irrenunciáveis” do ordenamento. Só estes nos permitem uma abertura da constituição a várias visões do homem sem cair em insanáveis contradições e o debate sobre quais são estes ainda é escasso. (para mais Ratzinguer, Verdade – Valores – Poder, 2006)

Um melhor exemplo de como o ordenamento procura ter esta abertura a diferentes conceções de homem, vinculando o juiz constitucional a fazer este exercício de ponderação até onde deve ir a tolerância/quais são os seus irrenunciáveis, é no exercício do direito de objeção de consciência, que também é uma das novidades deste acórdão.

O direito de objeção de consciência

Mesmo existindo doutrina a afirma o respeito completo da objeção de consciência na presente lei (Jónatas Machado, 2023), o tribunal constitucional foi mais generoso e considerou que o legislador foi longe demais na compressão da liberdade de consciência quanto aos deveres acessórios impostos àquele que se recuse cumprir a regra geral de prestação do serviço de eutanásia por razões de consciência (objetor). A visão apresentada pelo acórdão foi a de que a objeção de consciência era uma decorrência lógica da liberdade de consciência e que o legislador, ao exigir a explicitação da natureza da objeção ao seu paciente, estaria a restringir de forma desproporcionada a liberdade de consciência do objetor, já que esta inclui também a liberdade de não manifestação das suas convicções.

Parece que estaria aqui em causa o princípio da adequação, já que o tribunal não consegue identificar de que modo é que a medida pode ser apta (ao contrário do que defendem muitos dos votos de vencido) a assegurar a sinceridade do objetor, o seu respeito pelos princípios de igualdade ou a promoção do diálogo médico-paciente (voto de vencido de Figueiredo Dias). No fundo o tribunal não conseguiu identificar nenhum motivo que pudesse justificar essa restrição e, por isso, este regime para os objetores deveria prever apenas os requisitos que garantissem uma justa adequação entre os valores em confronto.

O requisito imposto não parece restringir a objeção de consciência que efetivamente ficou salvaguardada, afetando sim a dimensão negativa da liberdade de consciência. Podemos em abstrato até admitir que pudesse ter existido algum fundamento razoável para impor esta interferência ao objetor. Afinal o objetor pretende efetivamente manifestar a sua consciência, por isso alguma manifestação ela terá de ser. Mas mesmo que assim fosse, este acórdão relembra algo essencial: a objeção de consciência não é uma prerrogativa do legislador. É um dever constitucional, pelo que não deve ser concretizado de forma arbitrária, mas sim dentro do respeito por todos os princípios constitucionais.

Efetivamente e assim o afirma o acórdão, o direito à objeção de consciência tal como previsto na nossa constituição é uma decorrência da liberdade de consciência, fruto de ponderação entre fins que a norma visa prosseguir e a liberdade de consciência que tem aplicabilidade direta na constituição na sua vertente de agir conforme à consciência. Não é essa a visão de toda a doutrina (veja-se os votos de vencido), mas é nesse sentido que vão os elementos teleológicos, sistemáticos e históricos do artigo 41º/6 e foi esta a visão que vingou no presente acórdão (como já tinha defendido no meu relatório de mestrado). Quando esteja em causa um dever jurídico que coloca um cidadão num grave dilema moral -nesta lógica de tolerância de que falámos- o legislador deve salvaguardar estas consciências, sempre que não haja razões maiores que o impeçam: por exemplo, os médicos objetores de realização de IVG, não o podem fazer quando estejam em causa risco de vida.

Podemos considerar a garantia da objeção de consciência nestas situações uma boa conciliação dos valores em presença, feita pelo legislador. De facto, ainda que em nome de uma dignidade como autonomia o legislador tenha atribuído um direito a um cidadão, não deve impor a outro, contra essa mesma autonomia, um dever de a prestar, pois, como defendi no meu relatório, impor a alguém que vá contra a sua consciência é mais agressivo do que não satisfazer uma exigência de consciência de alguém que não a pode realizar sozinha. E mesmo que o legislador não o tivesse feito, pela aplicabilidade direta deste preceito, poderia ainda assim o órgão jurisdicional reconhecer no caso concreto um direito do objetor sincero, pela importância que a liberdade de consciência tem para o nosso ordenamento.

Assim, a objeção de consciência apresenta-se como um exercício de reflexão quanto aos irrenunciáveis do nosso ordenamento (uma autonomia levada ao extremo não pode nunca ter uma interferência ainda maior na autonomia de outro) e como uma boia de salvamento para assegurar um mínimo de coerência perante um legislador que ao interferir em áreas com forte conteúdo valorativo, tem de tomar opções axiológicas não compartilhadas por todos.

Nota da autora: grande parte deste post, baseia-se em muitas das ideias já debatidas no relatório do Mestrado Científico, apresentado na Cadeira de Direito Constitucional em 2024: Objeção de consciência médica: Uma perspetiva jusconstitucional do recente caso da eutanásia.

Media: Bruno Gonçalves

The post Um tribunal conciliador numa sociedade de clivagens? – 307/2025 TC: O mais recente acórdão da eutanásia appeared first on Lisbon Public Law.

Anti-democratic movements are not unknown on the internet, existing on it since the 20th century, although limited to obscure and sparsely inhabited corners. It was only during the Barack Obama presidency in the U.S. that extremist movements gained popularity on social media by resorting to conspiracy theories and reaching a worldwide audience for the first time. Algorithms created to encourage engagement on social media, along with greater interaction with extremist publications due to the emotional reactions they provoke, offered these movements a new predominance, resulting in Donald Trump's first election in 2016, and not even fact-checking mechanisms during Trump's first presidency were able to stop the spread of direct attacks on the 2020 electoral process in the US.

The European Union has not been oblivious to the growth of anti-democratic movements on social media, as due to their international nature they have also affected all EU Member States. In order to try to prevent the same events that occurred in the USA, the European legislator resorted to the Digital Services Act (DSA). By regulating the activities of very large online platforms (VLOPs), which include all major social networks , e.g., Facebook, TikTok, X, Instagram, the DSA requires, in its article 34, that they assess the existence of systemic risks present in their systems, including "Any actual or foreseeable negative effects on civic discourse and electoral processes, and public security", in accordance with paragraph 1(c) of the same article.

The wording of this paragraph demonstrates a clear concern with the effects that discourse on social networks can have on the Democratic Rule of Law, however, given the ambiguity of the rule, going beyond the interpretation of this concern is a challenge for both VLOPS and supervisory authorities. At no time does the DSA determine what should be understood as negative effects on civic discourse and electoral processes, revealing the difficulty of the European legislator in implementing this rule. See, for example, recital (62) of the DSA, in which the legislator limited itself to merely repeating the text of Article 34(1)(c), once again without ever specifying what should be understood as real or foreseeable negative effects. This is an amendment to the final version of the DSA compared to the one proposed by the European Parliament and Council, in which, despite restricting the systemic risks against civic discourse and electoral processes to " intentional manipulation of their service...", in Article 26(1)(c) of the proposal, equivalent to Article 34(1)(c) of the final version, it specifies, in recital (57), through an illustrative list, the facts from which such risks may arise, e.g., "… creation of fake accounts, the use of bots, and other automated or partially automated behaviours, which may lead to the rapid and widespread dissemination of information that is illegal content or incompatible with an online platform’s terms and conditions". These differences with the final version of the DSA demonstrate a clear insecurity of the European legislator in the realization of negative effects against civic discourse and electoral processes, preferring to maintain a purely abstract norm.

There are several contents on social meida that have real negative effects on civic discourse and also on electoral processes. The entire manospheremovement, based on an idea of male superiority over women and the recoup of the social position of "alpha" men, with a confessed proximity to the far-right, whose targets are mostly adolescent boys, resulting in a significant increase in violence against women on social media, and also in real life. We will also be facing negative effects on electoral processes in the face of cases such as that of Elon Musk, the current owner of X, who used his own platform to promote and directly support the AfD, the German far-right party, and also Georgia Meloni, the far-right Italian prime minister.

These two cases, if the rule in question existed in isolation from the rest of the DSA, would not cause any doubts regarding its inclusion within the scope of the DSA, however, due to the adequate obligations to respect the fundamental rights of platform users, especially the right to freedom of expression, e.g., in the enforcement of the terms and conditions (Article 14, (4)) or in the mitigation of risks by VLOPS (Article 35(1)), determining whether these cases should be included in the risks to be assessed and mitigated by VLPOs becomes complex and ambiguous, resulting in its own questions.

Regarding the manosphere community, we are faced with several users who create and publish similar content harmful to civic discourse, but this fact alone does not reveal the existence of a systemic risk to be mitigated by VLOPS. Systemic risks, as can be taken from Article 34(1), should be risks derived from the pillars and the core functions of the platforms, including algorithms, so the mere existence of this type of content cannot be considered a risk. Different will be the situations in which the algorithm itself demonstrates a greater preference for this type of content, something that has begun to be verified. If it turns out that the algorithms are increasing the relevance of extremist content, especially on short-form content platforms such as Tiktok or Youtube Shorts, pushing users to these communities, we believe that VLOPS will be obliged to mitigate such systemic risks, at the risk of sanctions for non-compliance with the DSA. Unfortunately, due to the secrecy surrounding the creation and operation of the algorithms used, it is not challenging for VLOPS to contest any allegation of non-compliance, claiming that such results do not start from the code of the algorithms and that any action against such content would violate the right to freedom of expression. It seems inevitable to us that any case involving the application of Article 34(1)(c) of the DSA will end up in the Court of Justice of the European Union, and it will be up to the Courts to do the difficult work of implementing the criteria for the application of this rule.

Regarding the case of Elon Musk's active participation in the electoral processes of Member States, there is another question that arises. In the face of publications on his X account demonstrating support for anti-democratic parties, should we consider that we are facing communications from Elon Musk as a natural person, or Elon Musk CEO and representative of the platform? For other social media CEOs, with a more reserved life and away from public opinion, the answer would be relatively simple, however, Elon Musk has actively connected his person with his companies, as if one did not exist without the other, making the distinction between them quite dubious. In addition, Musk allegedly forced the change of X's algorithm to promote his posts over those of any other user. Once again, we believe that we are facing the existence of systemic risks, in this case with real or foreseeable effects on the electoral processes of the Member States, however, once again due to the abstractedness of the rule under analysis, if the supervisory authorities decided to use it to combat this intervention in electoral processes, we consider that such a case would also be decided in the Court of Justice.

The European legislator has demonstrated in Article 34(1)(c) a clear and commendable desire to protect civic discourse and electoral processes from the democratic rule of law, however, by refraining from implementing this extremely abstract norm, it prevents both the control authorities and the VLOPs themselves from effectively combating the existence of systemic risks on their platforms. The fate of the implementation of this rule seems inevitable to us, it will be up to the Court of Justice to do so, however, its abstract nature seems to result in a fear on the part of the supervisory authorities to resort to this rule, delaying the necessary process of jurisprudential implementation.

The post Efeitos negativos no discurso cívico e processos eleitorais: É possível ir além de uma mera intenção de proteção? appeared first on Lisbon Public Law.

The reality of tecnopolitics requires robust legal frameworks to ensure that political advertising remains transparent and accountable. The recent EU regulation on political advertising is the European response to fight opaque advertising practices aimed at enhancing ads transparency, protecting voter data and limiting the influence of micro-targeted ads during election campaigns.

This EU attempt to create a harmonized framework across member states will reshape national laws in several respects. In this blog post I aim to reflect on how this regulation, fully entering into force in October 25, will impact on Portugal’s legal approach to political advertising.

EU’s New Political Advertising Regulation: A Brief Overview

The EU political advertising regulation targets the rising concerns over how political ads are deployed online, particularly during sensitive periods like election campaigns. Prior to the regulation, the Commission had already published guidelines with a number of recommended measures for very large online platforms and search engines to mitigate systemic online risks that could affect the integrity of elections, thus providing guidance for the European Parliament elections held in June 2024. In the same context, the Commission stated that political advertising should be clearly identified as such, in anticipation of the new regulation on transparency and targeting of political advertising.

The EU political advertising regulation, considering the concerns about the spread of unidentified political ads, or ads originating in third country entities or sponsored by third country nationals, requires greater transparency by imposing clear disclosures on who funds political ads, limiting the use of personal data for targeted advertising techniques, including observed and inferred data, and adopting rules on their supervision and enforcement.

One of the standout traits of the regulation is the mandate for providers of political advertising services to maintain publicly accessible databases of all political ads, detailing information about the sponsor, reach, and target audience. This transparency is pivotal also for countries to reinforce political accountability. By mandating transparency around who funds political ads and how they are targeted, the regulation ensures that politicians and parties can no longer operate behind a veil of secrecy. This visibility makes it easier for voters, journalists, and watchdog organizations to hold political actors responsible for their messaging strategies and content.

What the EU Political Advertising Regulation is not

While fostering transparency and accountability to the political advertising landscape, the EU regulation does not affect the content of political advertisements nor the legal competence of member-states to regulate political advertising within their borders. In addition, it must also be said that the regulation does not "alter the rules regulating the conduct and financing of political campaigning, including general bans or limitations on political advertising during specified periods, the so-called silence periods, donations by individual campaign donors or prohibitions regarding the use of commercial advertising for election campaign purposes” (see recital 14).

Yet, the EU Regulation sets common standards that all must meet. This harmonization aims to prevent gaps and inconsistencies that political actors might exploit by operating across different countries.

Harmonizing National Laws Across the EU

Countries across the EU are now tasked with reviewing and revising their national laws to comply with the regulation’s provisions. This process involves not only updating legislation but also establishing or empowering enforcement bodies to oversee compliance and address violations effectively. A profound implication of the regulation is that Member-States, as stated in its recital 12, are prevented from maintaining or introducing, in their national laws, provisions on the transparency of political advertising that diverge from those laid down in it.

Also, as mentioned by  van Drunen, Natalie Helberger e Ronan Ó Fathaigh, an area that will be subject to updates relates to how Member States define political advertising, particularly given the fact that some Member States treat political advertising in a broad sense.

What This Means for Portuguese Law

Portugal already regulates regulating political advertising, primarily through the Electoral Law and the Law on Political Parties’ Financing and Transparency, but the new EU regulation demands a comprehensive overhaul.

Firstly, Portugal’s Advertising Code (Decree-Law 330/90 of October 23, as amended) clearly separates political propaganda and advertising, stating that for the purposes of the law political propaganda is not considered advertising.

Secondly, political advertising in Portugal is currently governed by the Electoral Law (Lei Eleitoral), particularly Law No. 14/79 of May 16, 1979, as amended, which regulates electoral processes, including campaign rules and advertising restrictions.

In addition, Law 72-A/2015 states that, from the publication of the decree setting the date of the elections, political advertising carried out directly or indirectly through commercial advertising media is prohibited.

Clearly these laws were drafted before the digital era and do not fully address online political advertising or the nuances of micro-targeted campaigns on social media platforms.

Even the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), implemented in Portugal via Law No. 58/2019, has set strong foundations for personal data protection but leaves gaps specifically related to political advertising practices.

Specifically, Portuguese law will need to:

- Reconsider the provision in the Advertising Code – in my view already revoked –which differentiates political propaganda and commercial advertising.
- Review the prohibition on commercial advertising during election periods.
- Establishing clear rules on the conduct of influencers.
- Strengthen transparency requirements by mandating clear and accessible disclosures on the funding and sponsorship of political advertisements, beyond current obligations.
- Introduce stricter controls on the use of personal data for political targeting in line with GDPR provisions.
- Enhance the powers of oversight bodies such as the Portuguese National Election Commission (Comissão Nacional de Eleições - CNE), enabling it to monitor digital political ads actively and enforce penalties for non-compliance.
- Require online platforms operating in Portugal to maintain public registers of political advertisements and designate local representatives, ensuring easier enforcement and transparency.

These reforms will align Portuguese legislation with the EU regulation’s objectives, guaranteeing that digital political campaigns operate under clear and fair rules.

For political actors

Portuguese political actors, in the specific sense of the EU regulation, will need to revise their digital campaign strategies accordingly. Current laws impose general restrictions on campaigning near election days, but the EU regulation’s detailed rules on ad targeting and blackout periods will require more precise national provisions.

This shift will push campaigns toward broader, more transparent messaging, helping to level the playing field and maintain democratic discourse free from hidden manipulation. For instance, undisclosed political advertisements, often referred to as “dark ads,” which appear only to selected audiences without public scrutiny, will no longer be permitted.

The regulation also prohibits the use of personal data collected without explicit consent for political targeting, closing loopholes that allowed campaigns to exploit personal profiles on social media and other platforms.

Conclusion

Technology is fundamentally changing politics and the political actors due to an increasing number of services operating in the field of political advertising. In the television era, political advertising was mainly focused on audiovisual media and campaign periods. In the digital era, a growing and diverse number of political advertising services operate outside traditional media, including- Political consulting firms, advertising agencies, ad-tech platforms, social media, public relations firms, influencers, data analysis and measurement operators.

By establishing clear rules for transparency, data protection, and accountability, the EU regulation on political advertising not only harmonizes national laws but also protects the autonomy of voters and safeguards democratic integrity. As Portugal adapts to these changes, it stands to benefit from a more open and fair political advertising landscape—one that enhances trust in its electoral processes and ultimately its democracy.

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Regulation (EU) 2024/1689, which establishes harmonized rules on Artificial Intelligence (the AI Act), represents a landmark in the global regulation of Artificial Intelligence (AI). Its overall structure is based on a risk-based approach and categorizes AI systems into four levels, ranging from "minimal risk" (not subject to the Regulation) to "unacceptable risk" (which is prohibited).

At first glance, the AI Act appears effective in terms of compliance: it requires risk assessments, documentation, testing, and human oversight. Compliance: exige avaliações de risco, documentação, testes e supervisão humana.

However, when it comes to human oversight (defined in various parts of the AI Act, but especially in Article 14), a serious challenge arises: it is a requirement that presupposes humans can effectively monitor and intervene in autonomous operations at all times.

The article states that “High-risk AI systems shall be designed and developed in such a way, including with appropriate human-machine interface tools, that they can be effectively overseen by natural persons during the period in which they are in use” (Article 14(1)).

The expression “effectively overseen” essentially implies “constantly supervised.” And expecting full human oversight ignores decades of research on automation complacency (or, as the AI Act itself puts it, “automation bias”).

Although the AI Act explicitly acknowledges the need “to remain aware of the possible tendency of automatically relying or over-relying on the output produced by a high-risk AI system (automation bias), in particular for high-risk AI systems […]” (Article 14(4)(b)), this seems more a theoretical acknowledgment than a substantive treatment of the problem.

This is even more critical when considering autonomous vehicles (AVs).

In scenarios where machines handle the majority of tasks (and do so correctly and efficiently), human operators gradually disengage. They trust the automation and may be unable to react promptly when the system fails. This is not a new phenomenon. Researchers such as Raja Parasuraman and Dietrich Manzey in the field of Applied Psychology have, for over a decade, discussed mental fatigue and cognitive load as direct impacts on human performance in attention-demanding tasks. The inability to maintain the required level of attention is not about laziness — it is a cognitive consequence of long-term reliance on systems that rarely require intervention.

The phenomenon in which human operators lose skills when interacting with highly automated systems — known as the "out-of-the-loop performance problem" — has been studied since the 1980s (especially in the context of air traffic control). It shows that when humans are not continuously engaged in an activity, they lose situational awareness and the ability to respond when something goes wrong.

Therefore, although the AI Act demands human oversight, it does not address the psychological and operational limitations of such oversight. It merely assumes that assigning responsibility to a human and mentioning the risk of automation complacency are sufficient. In practice, an AV operator is not supervising — they are set up to fail.

Although the AI Act went through extensive institutional negotiation and includes input from stakeholders across industry and civil society, its structure remains primarily technocratic. Especially regarding AVs, it is treated mostly as a technical safety and compliance challenge, rather than a social and political issue involving deeper notions of security.

Without being overly pessimistic, it is necessary to recognize that the AI Act holds real promise: it introduces obligations of transparency, documentation, and oversight that can help curb harmful uses of AI. 

But the reality is that in contexts like AVs, where human control is more symbolic than real, these mechanisms may be insufficient. 

If we rely on human oversight — which does not and cannot reliably occur — we risk turning the deployment of autonomous vehicles into a risky public experiment with potentially harmful consequences.

© photo: https://blog.sintef.com/digital-en/automated-vehicles-how-to-keep-humans-in-control/

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This all means that data sets to train AI for the purpose of performing legal tasks such as interpreting normative sentences within statutes or judicial decisions are very peculiar. On the one hand both legal language and legal methodology tends to favour repeatability as a way to foster trust on the legal system – this is something wonderful for the purpose of training Large Language Models (LLM) – on the other hand, however, legal data sets are fugitive pieces – to train an LLM you will need i) the data set comprising as much normative texts as possible, on the lines of the Central Registry of Births, Marriages and Deaths in Saramago’s All the Names; and ii) the data set comprising judicial decisions that interpret and balance rules. These are only the two essential data sets that you’ll need to have to train any LLM into doing something similar, even if only ancillary, to what a lawyer (in whatever capacity) does. You could have more. For instance a data set comprising as much legal doctrine commenting judicial decisions.

This goes to show that legal data sets are not only language dependent, but very much legal system dependent, as data from any other legal system, even if using the same natural language, will feed the LLM with different texts of which different norms can be obtained or even similar texts of which similar norms can be obtained although applied differently by courts.

Hyperlocal approach must then be the appropriate way, as a recent piece has highlighted regarding a new legal AI being developed in Germany. This is actually a boon for a small country like Portugal, where the cost of obtaining said data sets is much lower than in big countries. In some cases the work is half done: think about the work being done over the years by the Diário da República Eletrónico, who now owns the data set of almost all the normative texts in force in Portugal. The same can be said about the old “Bases Jurídico-Documentais”, now at Instituto de Gestão Financeira e Equipamentos da Justiça, that includes a wide array of Portuguese case-law. This is why Portugal already offers some interesting choices in the field of legal AI.

Can it draft a legal opinion that you can trust blindly and send to your client? Can it write a legal paper that offers coherent interpretations to contentious normative texts? Maybe not, depending on the complexity of the matter, but it’s getting there and it will improve rapidly. Not only law firms but also legal research centres must take advantage of this new tool in the system. This will help address the elephant in the room: at a given time where is the line that separates what AI can do for you in a legal system and what is still for humans to perform. Complex balancing operations stemming from normative conflicts not solvable through norms of conflicts seems to be the last frontier. Don’t take it from me. Take it from AI. Here’s what Perplexity has to answer to my very simple question:

Is there a connection between the Mendonca-Moreso legal method of balancing and AI?

There is a conceptual connection between the Mendonca-Moreso legal method of balancing and artificial intelligence (AI), especially regarding how both approach complex decision-making involving competing principles or interests.

The Mendonca-Moreso model frames balancing as an intellectual operation for establishing normative preferences in situations of irresolvable normative conflicts, such as those involving fundamental rights and constitutional principles. This method relies on the articulation of reasons for action and the justification of choices in concrete cases, often requiring the weighing of conflicting values and the assignment of relative importance to each.

AI systems designed for legal reasoning, particularly those used for decision support or automated legal analysis, often implement similar balancing mechanisms. These systems can be programmed to evaluate multiple legal principles, assign weights or priorities based on the context, and justify outcomes by referencing the underlying reasons-mirroring the structure of the Mendonca-Moreso balancing method. The process of quantifying interests, comparing them, and providing reasoned justifications is central to both advanced AI legal tools and the balancing method.

However, while AI can operationalize aspects of balancing (such as aggregating and comparing quantifiable factors), the Mendonca-Moreso approach emphasizes the irreplaceable role of normative judgment and the need for reasoned justification rooted in fairness and context, which remains a challenge for current AI systems to fully replicate.

In summary, the Mendonca-Moreso method of balancing provides a theoretical foundation that aligns well with the logic underlying AI-based legal decision-making tools, although the human element of normative justification is not yet fully automatable.

This also goes to show the importance of good legal data sets: almost all the references that AI could list to support its answer were authored by Lisbon Public Law researchers (with two notable exceptions).

Ah! And there was still time to ask ChatGPT to illustrate said relation between the Mendonca-Moreso method and AI: it’s very humbling at least.

The post Conjuntos de Dados, Inteligência Artificial e o Método de Ponderação de Mendonca-Moreso appeared first on Lisbon Public Law.

We aim to reflect on the scope and possible existence of a “right to explanation”. The Artificial Intelligence (“AI”) systems are characterized by their opacity, something that makes it more difficult to comprehend the decisions adopted. For the GDPR, and if there is an automated individual decision-making, the data subject will exercise the rights set out in article 22, namely: the right to obtain human intervention on the part of the controller, to express his or her point of view and to contest the decision. The provision does not establish, expressly, the right to explanation of the decision. The only mention is made on recital 71 of the GDPR, according to which the data subject must have the possibility to obtain “an explanation of the decision reached after such assessment and to challenge the decision”. This was the main argument presented in legal scholarship by authors such as Bryce Goodman and Seth Flaxman. Therefore, the recognition of the right to explanation would be inserted within the scope of the adequate guarantees’ measures of the data subject.

We know, however, that the recitals do not have binding legal force, constituting an interpretative guide. Recently, the Court of Justice (“CJ”) had the opportunity to analyze this issue on the case CK v. Magistrat der Stadt Wien (C-203/22). A mobile telephone operator refused the data subject the conclusion or extension of a mobile telephone contract, which would have required a monthly payment, on the ground that, according to an automated credit assessment, she did not have sufficient financial creditworthiness. The data subject brought the matter before the Austrian data protection authority, which ordered the disclosure to the data subject meaningful information about the logic involved in the automated decision-making based on personal data concerning her. After an appeal before the Federal Administrative Court of Austria, this question arose, within a preliminary ruling, to the CJ.

To what concerns this question, the court unequivocally recognized that the data subject will not be able to fully exercise the rights under article 22(3) if there is not a comprehension of the motives that lead to a certain decision. Thus, the CJ supports the existence of a “meaningful information about the logic involved”, invoking for that effect recital 71 and article 15(1)(h) of the GDPR. Hence, the duty regarding which the controller is required to respect will not be fulfilled by the mere communication of a complex mathematical formula (such as an algorithm), or by the detailed description of all the steps in automated decision-making, since none of those would constitute a sufficiently concise and intelligible explanation. Considering that most data subjects are not expected to be specialists in AI or mathematics, the explanation given must be intelligible.

In our point of view, this is the most important topic of the decision. For the first time, the CJ leaves it clear that a right to explanation is not a mere formality, as it must be accompanied by a logical, effective and transparent explanation on the criteria applied during the process of automated decision-making, in a way that the data controller can, effectively, understand. 

The court advocates that the explanation must be followed by a description of procedure and principles applied in such a way that the data subject can understand which of his or her personal data have been used in what way in the automated decision-making at issue.  

Firstly, we think that the arguments presented by the court are very interesting. For many years, the scholars that defended the right to explanation based their position on recital 71, something that was criticized by many authors, precisely for the absence of binding value.

Additionally, the court recognizes that the explanation given to the data subject will have to be effective, as it is not enough for controllers to give abstract information and a mere mathematical formula. Considering that AI is characterized by its opacity, and that is not expected to have the knowledge to fully understand algorithmic systems, which may prompt controllers to reconsider their policies.

This ruling represents a significant advancement in the protection of data subjects. It is relevant to mention that, regardless of the ambiguity attached to the GDPR, the AI Act foresaw on article 86 a right to explanation. Thus, any person affected by a decision adopted by a high-risk AI system and if it considers that the decision had an adverse impact on its health, safety and fundamental rights will have the right to explanation concerning the role of the AI system in the decision-making procedure and the main elements of the decision taken. Nevertheless, the inclusion of this right on the AI Act does not solve all the questions. On one hand, not all automated individual decision-making, for the GDPR’s context, will be adopted by high-risk AI systems. On the other hand, not all the outputs produced by a high-risk AI system will constitute and automated individual decision-making under the GDPR. In both scenarios a legal vacuum may be created, which is not desired.

Although it is not possible to anticipate the end of the doctrinal debate, the CJ made a tremendous step in the construction of the right to explanation. From now on, it will be relevant to assess how the protection of fundamental rights will take place in this digital context. what is clear is that the scholarship that denied, so far, the existence of a right to explanation will not be able to ignore this landmark decision of the court.

© image source: https://www.urmconsulting.com/blog/the-gdpr-5-myths-dispelled

Author: Diana Camões

The post O Direito à explicação no RGPD: o fim da querela doutrinal? appeared first on Lisbon Public Law.

The directive stipulates, in Article 5, that the dissemination of images or videos with sexually explicit content that has been falsely generated, particularly through artificial intelligence, should be punished when done without the consent of the person depicted. Deepfakes refer to digitally synthesized videos using deep learning techniques that allow the realistic replacement of a person’s appearance and voice with those of another. The provision targets images created through digital manipulation (for example, superimposing the victim's face on a body or sexual act they did not engage in), and does not require the content to be real—only that it appears so and is disseminated.

This approach marks a significant legal advancement by recognizing that the harm caused by digital artifacts can be as severe as that caused by genuine content. From a doctrinal perspective, it raises relevant questions regarding the materiality of the offense, the structure of subjective attribution, and the criteria for penal offensiveness in a digital environment.

The entry into force of the directive requires Portugal and other Member States to transpose it by June 14, 2027, which will necessitate amendments to the Penal Code or specific criminal legislation, as there is currently no specific provision addressing non-consensual sexual deepfakes. Therefore, a legislative movement at the European level is expected to align internal regulations with the directive.

It is important to note that while the Digital Services Act (DSA) already imposes obligations on platforms to remove illegal content and prevent systemic risks, it does not define the creation or sharing of such content as an offense in itself.

The interaction between the new European penal framework and the diligence duties of platforms under the DSA highlights an increasing trend of co-regulation in the digital space, where the protection of fundamental rights requires coordinated action between public and private entities. In this context, the criminalization of non-consensual sexual deepfakes constitutes an important step in the creation of a secure digital citizenship that respects human dignity.

Image source: Organization for Social Media Safety

The post A criminalização de deepfakes sexuais: um novo desafio para o direito penal digital appeared first on Lisbon Public Law.

By eliminating third-party fact-checking, Meta shifts responsibility for identifying and addressing falsehoods directly onto its users. This mirrors the model implemented by X, which struggled to fight effectively against misinformation during the US elections. While proponents claim this democratises fact-checking and prevents institutional bias, detractors highlight the inability of crowd-sourced moderation to keep up with sophisticated disinformation campaigns, including those orchestrated by state actors, especially when it comes to misinformation related to ethnic minorities, migrant workers and other marginalised groups.

The failure of unchecked misinformation on social media may negatively influence various areas of our lives and various social groups. Below, we will see several real-life cases in which social media have contributed to misinformation. One of the most striking examples is Facebook’s role in the Rohingya genocide in Myanmar. In 2017, Facebook was used to spread hate speech and incite violence against the Rohingya Muslim minority. The UN later identified Facebook’s failure to curb misinformation as a major factor in fuelling genocide. UN investigators highlighted concluded that Facebook had “substantively contributed to the level of acrimony and dissension and conflict” in Myanmar.

A key concern regarding Meta’s new policy is the increased risk of disinformation in political and security-sensitive contexts. The Business & Human Rights Resource Centre has called Meta’s decision a “reckless gamble,” emphasising that it jeopardises its 4 bln. users by potentially allowing unchecked falsehoods to circulate freely. Similarly, the Lowy Institute warns that the removal of professional fact-checkers could make Meta’s platforms fertile ground for authoritarian regimes seeking to manipulate public opinion, influence elections, and spread divisive rhetoric. For instance, in Brazil’s 2022 presidential election, widespread misinformation on social media platforms, including Meta’s, contributed to political unrest and distrust in democratic institutions as reports suggest vast majority of viral messages with false information were right-wing.

Beyond the political sphere, Meta’s decision to cease the fact-checking policy, may bring disinformation in public health sphere. During the COVID-19 pandemic, Facebook and Instagram became breeding grounds for false claims about vaccines, unproven treatments, and conspiracy theories. The Center for Countering Digital Hate found that just 12 influencers were responsible for 65% of anti-vaccine misinformation circulating on Facebook in 2021. The World Health Organization described this as an “infodemic”, where the spread of false health information became as dangerous as the virus itself.

Beyond democratic concerns, Meta’s shift also raises alarms about the spread of misinformation around climate change. It has played a pivotal role in amplifying both accurate scientific research and climate denialism. Research by Climate Action Against Disinformation claimed that platforms like Facebook allowed climate misinformation to spread unchecked, undermining efforts to combat global warming.

Lastly, the impact of Meta’s decision will also disproportionately affect activists and journalists who expose human rights abuses. Without robust fact-checking, online harassment campaigns could escalate, with authoritarian regimes using misinformation to discredit dissidents and suppress press freedom. This was seen in the Philippines under Rodrigo Duterte, where Facebook was widely used to spread false accusations against journalists and activists critical of the government. Maria Ressa, a Nobel Prize-winning journalist, was repeatedly targeted by disinformation campaigns that sought to undermine her credibility and justify her persecution.

Meta’s decision to end fact-checking marks a turning point in the battle against online misinformation and its broader impact on human rights. While the company argues that shifting to a user-driven model promotes open discourse, the risks of unchecked disinformation, state-sponsored propaganda, and political manipulation far outweigh the potential benefits. Without professional fact-checkers, the burden of verifying truth now falls on individual users, many of whom lack the expertise or resources to distinguish fact from fiction. This shift not only threatens public trust in online information but also raises urgent questions about the role of social media companies in safeguarding human rights and democratic values.

#humarights #meta #socialmedia #communitynotes #misinformation #factchecking #freedomofexpression

Image credits – Photo by Magnus Mueller on Pexels

https://www.pexels.com/photo/photo-of-hand-holding-a-black-smartphone-2818118

The post A decisão da Meta de acabar com a verificação de factos ameaça a democracia e os direitos fundamentais appeared first on Lisbon Public Law.

While it is true that online platforms are now the main point of access to information and other content on the Internet for most people, it is also true that there is a large amount of illegal content that can be uploaded and therefore accessed online, which in turn raises serious concerns that need resolute and effective responses. Indeed, what is illegal offline is also illegal online: I am talking about racist and xenophobic speech, which publicly incites hatred and violence. The importance of trusted flaggers is therefore unequivocal, especially regarding the big platforms that everyone knows about, like “Facebook” and “X”.

Under Article 22 of the DSA, and without prejudice to many other things that could be mentioned, three aspects stand out from the trusted flaggers regime.

1. The choice of trusted flaggers : until the DSA, and in practice, it was up to the online platform to choose its trusted flaggers, who could even be natural persons. As of the DSA, not only is the status of trusted flagger now exclusively granted to legal persons, but also the entities that currently assume this status in the context of the European Union must apply for it under the DSA, which presupposes that they fulfil the conditions set out in Article 22 of the Regulation;

2. Control: one of the problems that can occur in the context of trusted flaggers is that the signalling can be wrong, which can inevitably compromise the freedom of expression of the person responsible for sharing the content, which, after all, was not illegal. With the DSA, and in accordance with Article 22(6), when an online platform provider has information indicating that a trusted flagger has submitted a significant number of notifications that are insufficiently accurate, inaccurate or inadequately substantiated, it communicates this information to the Digital Services Coordinator who granted the trusted flagger status, who can initiate an investigation. If, following this investigation, the Coordinator concludes that the trusted flagger no longer fulfils the conditions laid down by the DSA, then he can revoke the status granted.

As you can see, the aim is to guarantee an appropriate balance between the legitimate rights and interests of all parties, namely between the freedom of expression of the person sharing the content and the trusted flagger.

3. Misuse: intrinsically linked to the previous point, what happens if trusted flaggers misuse notifications, namely because they contain information that is not true, jeopardising the freedom of expression of those who share the content?

With the DSA, online platform providers can suspend, for a reasonable period and after having issued a prior warning, the processing of notifications submitted through the notice and take down mechanisms by entities that frequently submit manifestly unfounded notifications or complaints. In turn, the assessment of whether these trusted flaggers are acting abusively is made based on Article 23 of the DSA, and the decision to suspend must be based on a case-by-case, diligent and objective basis.

Now that we're here, and as mentioned above, the existence of trusted flaggers is important in itself, but it's even more important in the current context. Indeed, following the US elections, the new Administration's almost absolute defense of freedom of expression is well known. And based on this new interpretation of the limits (or lack thereof) of that same freedom, not only has Elon Musk – owner of “X” – been putting pressure on Trump to allow him to circumvent European Union law - in particular, the DSA – but also the US Vice-President himself, not only threatened in his election campaign to make US support for NATO conditional on the EU not taking action against “X”, but also recently, in a speech in Munich, accused the European Union of “lacking freedom of expression”, given the excessive regulation it is subjected to (not only, but also, by the DSA).

If it is true that the existence of the DSA – and in particular the trusted flaggers –makes it possible to safeguard a minimum balance between freedom of expression on the one hand and any other fundamental rights that might be affected by the abusive use of that freedom on the other, it remains to be seen whether the European Union will be able to fight for the effectiveness of the DSA, both with the main online platforms and on the other side of the Atlantic. The answer to this question – which is not only legal, but political – will ultimately determine not only the survival of the Regulation, but also the survival of the European Union itself.

#DSA #trustedflaggers #freedomofspeech #USelections

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